Never Mind the Truth

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Never Mind the Truth

New York Times' Mea Culpa

The End of the Occupation

Bush and Blair appear to think that making declarations on Iraq is enough to change the realities on the ground

Gary Younge, Monday May 31, 2004, The Guardian

Seeing the US national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, testify before the 9/11 commission on CNN in April was a challenge in eye-ear coordination. While she eloquently spelled out the Bush administration's strategy for the war on terror, the tickertape of rolling news spewed out grim news from the front across the bottom of the screen. Your ears took in the official narrative: "We are in control and shaping a positive future for the Middle East." Your eyes traced the brutal reality: "This is a bloody mess and innocents are dying." At the very moment when Rice said that the invasion had removed a source "of violence and fear and instability in the world's most dangerous region", the tape read: "Iraq's interim interior minister Nuril Al-Badran announces his resignation; interior ministry is in charge of police forces."

At the point when she told the commission that invading Iraq was one of "the only choices that can ensure the safety of our nation for decades to come", the wire services reported: "Iraqis say air strike killed dozens gathered for prayers."

Politics has, to an extent, always been about the triumph of symbols over substance and assertion over actuality. But in the case of Iraq this trend seems to have reached its apogee, as though statements by themselves can fashion reality by the force of their own will and judgment. Declaration and proclamation have become everything. The question of whether they bear any relation to the world we actually live in seems like an unpleasant and occasionally embarrassing intrusion. The motto of the day both in Downing Street and the White House seems to be: "To say it is so is to make it so." These people are rewriting history before the ink on the first draft is even dry.

The most obvious example was President George Bush's speech to the nation last week, as he struggled to define the mission in Iraq. "On June 30 the occupation will end and Iraqis will govern their own affairs," he said. To understand what will happen at the end of the month it would make more sense to turn the sentence inside out so that it says the opposite: "On June 30 the occupation will continue and Iraqis will not govern their own affairs."

To the charge that this is leftwing axe-grinding, look no further than the lead editorial in the Economist, which supported the war. "To those who complain that in this case the sovereignty of the Iraqi government is going to be pretty bogus, the answer of Messrs Bush and Blair ought to be the honest one. Of course it is. In Iraq's present context, sovereignty is just a word on paper, and not even the most important one."

Only yesterday the Iraqi governing council members complained of "massive pressure" to endorse Adnan Pachachi, America's choice for president of the interim government, even though most of them favoured another candidate, more critical of the US. The US, which has the final say in the matter, threatened not to recognise the council's choice. Given that the US chose the members of the council, one can only imagine how they will get on with a truly independent, democratically accountable group of representatives.

Sadly, we are not about to find out. What will in fact happen on June 30 is that a former CIA operative, Iyad Allawi, who was picked by the US with little involvement from the United Nations, will head a puppet regime. This "sovereign" country will have 138,000 US troops on its soil, not to mention soldiers from Britain and elsewhere, and its "sovereign" leader will have no control over what they do. "US forces remain under US command and will do what is necessary to protect themselves," says Colin Powell.

Tony Blair for once disagreed. "If there is a political decision as to whether you go into a place like Fallujah in a particular way, that has to be done with the consent of the Iraqi government and the final political control remains with the Iraqi government," he said. But by the next day he was back in his box. "We are both absolutely agreed that there should be full sovereignty transferred to the Iraqi people, and the multinational force should remain under American command," he told the Commons.

In so doing he revealed two of the golden rules in this new era of politics by pronouncement. First, so long as you say things boldly and confidently, they do not have to make any sense. Second, whatever announcement you make last negates all announcements you've made before.

Indeed, Blair, of whom Doris Lessing, the novelist, once said: "He believes in magic. That if you say a thing, it is true," is the high priest of this dark art. Here are a few corkers he pulled out of the hat in the past two years.

"There is no doubt at all that the development of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein poses a severe threat, not just to the region but to the wider world," he said in April 2002. Just four months before he bombed Iraq he said: "Nobody in the British government is in favour of military action against Iraq." And then there is my favourite, from this April. "We have been involving the UN throughout," by which we can only presume he means bugging the offices of the secretary general.

The least kind, and yet most obvious, explanation for why these statements have no resemblance to the truth would be that Blair keeps lying. A more generous interpretation would be that he is a hopelessly wishful thinker.

In fact, wishful thinking has been the entire intellectual and political thrust of the "liberal hawks" - the lefties who backed the war. They wished that the UN would pass a second resolution, that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, that the Iraqi people would come out and greet western soldiers, that the Bush administration had noble intentions and that Blair could exert influence over the US in the Middle East. Some of us wished that they would get real.

For one of the most pernicious baseless assertions in recent times is the notion that there is any such thing as a "liberal hawk". There isn't. People are not liberal just because they say so. For the term to have any meaning at all they have to share some common ground on which the bombing of Iraq has no place. There was no progressive case for bypassing the will of the UN and international law and bombing a country that posed no immediate threat to any other. There was a liberal dilemma about how you confront vicious dictators. But in the case of Iraq it no more led to war than the liberal dilemma over how to solve crime leads to capital punishment.

Having seen their wish-list shredded by the neo-conservatives in the Pentagon and the White House, some now wring their hands and wonder where it all went wrong, while others become ever more bullish and bizarre in defence of a stance long since discredited.

Liberals never provided a case for this war. There was "liberal" cover for it. A fact for which conservatives are delighted and those co-opted by them should be ashamed.

The New York Times has issued a mea culpa for its slanted coverage of Iraq leading up to the war and occupation, saying that its reporting in a number of stories "was not as rigorous as it should have been" and relied on reports from informants whose credibility was later called into question. In a lengthy editor's note that appears inside the front section of Wednesday's [May 26] editions, the Times said that reports of claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction or ties to international terrorists contained information that was unchallenged by editors and was not adequately followed up.

The newspaper said it had also more prominently featured articles containing alarming claims about Iraq under Saddam Hussein than follow-up stories that countered those claims. Many of the stories used information from Iraqi exiles and critics of Hussein who were pressing the United States to oust the Iraqi leader, but the Times said it did not always emphasise the informants' motivations. The Times cited five stories – including several page one articles – written between 2001 and 2003 that had accounts of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons in Iraq.

It admitted that none of the stories have ever been independently verified, and some were even discredited by its own reporters at another news organisation. And, said the Times, when in-house journalists wrote stories that refuted the original reporting, the corrections were buried. Complicating matters, said the newspaper, the accounts of Iraqi exiles seeking regime change in their country were often eagerly confirmed by United States officials convinced of the need to intervene in Iraq.

(Radio Havana Cuba, May 26, 2004)

New York Times Issues Another Mea Culpa

The New York Times has issued another mea culpa over its Iraq war coverage, saying the newspaper was duped by "the cunning campaign" of those at the Pentagon who wanted the world to believe that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. Times executive Daniel Okrent said "some stories pushed Pentagon assertions so aggressively one could almost sense the military rankings on the shoulders of editors."

The half-page critique of the newspaper's coverage during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq followed a separate admission signed by "the editors" last week that said the newspaper had not been as "rigorous as it should have been" in questioning Iraqi exiles. Okrent said that in the run-up to the invasion, "cloaked government sources ... insinuated themselves and their agendas into prewar coverage." The newspaper's failure, he said, was institutional, and admitted that "to anyone who read the paper between September 2002 and June 2003, the impression that Saddam Hussein possessed, or was acquiring, a frightening arsenal of weapons of mass destruction seemed unmistakable".

Okrent said much of the inaccurate coverage was "inappropriately italicised by lavish front-page display and heavy-breathing headlines". He said other stories that had challenged the assertions or tried to put the claims into perspective "were played as quietly as a lullaby". In one instance, a challenging story by James Risen, entitled "CIA aides feel pressure in preparing Iraqi reports", was completed several days before the invasion and "unaccountably" held for a week. The report finally appeared three days after the war broke out and was buried on page 10 of the newspaper's second section. Okrent said that many so-called "scoops" based on unsubstantiated revelations have still to be revisited.

(Radio Havana Cuba, May 31, 2004)

Submitted by Anthony P Davis, London, England

As of March 23, 2004, 272 Iraqi detainees were released from Abu Ghraib prison. All complained of mistreatment and wrongful arrest and detention; earlier, on Sunday, March 21, 2004, 183 detainees were released without any publicity.

On April 14, 2004, at a joint press conference by Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, and Mr Massoud Barzani, President of the Iraqi Governing Council – Baghdad, Lakhdar Brahimi stated:

"…. in February as well as at present, we heard of many grievances which need to be addressed. Detainees are held often without charge or trial. They should be either charged or released, and their families and lawyers must have access to them. The issue of former military personnel also needs attention. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand that thousands upon thousands of teachers, university professors, medical doctors and hospital staff, engineers and other professionals who are sorely needed, have been dismissed within the de-Baathification process, and far too many of those cases have yet to be reviewed."

And in answer of the question of people held without charge Brahimi stated that "this problem should be resolved now…".

As of May 3, 2004, the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Theo van Boven, issued the following statement:

"The Special Rapporteur on torture is seriously concerned about recent reports of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of Iraqi detainees by United States of America and United Kingdom military forces serving under the Coalition Provisional Authority.

The freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a non-derogable right. The prohibition of torture is explicitly affirmed in article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as well as in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the treatment of prisoners and protection of civilians, and in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

The Special Rapporteur calls upon all countries with forces serving in Iraq to take prompt and effective steps to investigate, prosecute and impose appropriate sanctions on any persons guilty of the alleged violations, as well as provide an effective remedy and adequate reparation for the victims of these abuses."

As of May 5, 2004, the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on arbitrary detention of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Leïla Zerrougui, issued the following statement:

"The Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on arbitrary detention expresses her serious concern regarding the uncertainty of the legal status of many detainees currently subjected to interrogation in Iraq, in the context of reports of torture of people in detention by United States and United Kingdom military officers serving under the Coalition Provisional Authority.

According to the information received by the Working Group, the majority of persons in detention in Iraq have been arrested during public demonstrations, at checkpoints and in house raids. They are being considered 'security detainees’ or ‘suspected of anti-Coalition activities’. The Working Group's Chairperson-Rapporteur is seriously disturbed by the fact that these persons have not been granted access to a court to be able to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, as required by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 9).

The Working Group calls upon the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council to allow the clarification of the legal status of each person detained in Iraq and to apply the rules and norms enshrined in Articles 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 9 and 14 of the civil and political rights Covenant.

The Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on arbitrary detention calls upon the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Iraqi Governing Council and all countries with military forces serving in Iraq to respect the principles and norms of international human rights law and, in the case of persons entitled in principle to prisoner-of-war status, to the norms and principles of international humanitarian law, as enshrined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949."

As of May 7, 2004, excerpts of the "Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation" were published in the day’s Wall Street Times. (The report was given to the Coalition Provisional Authority in February 2002. In a press conference on May 7, 2004, the ICRC's director of operations, Pierre Krähenbühl said that "we were dealing here with a broader pattern and a system, as opposed to individual acts...")

"The ICRC draws the attention of the Coalition Forces to a number of serious violations of humanitarian law:

1. Brutality against protected person upon capture and initial custody, sometimes causing death or serious injury.
2. Physical or psychological coercion during interrogation to secure information.
3. Prolonged solitary confinement in cells devoid of daylight.
4. Excessive or disproportionate use of force against persons deprived of their liberty resulting in death or injury during their period of internment.
5. Seizure and confiscation of private belongings.

The main places of internment where mistreatment allegedly took place included battle group unit stations; the military sections of Camp Cropper and Abu Ghraib Correctional Facility; Al-Baghdadi, Heat Base and Hubbania Camp in Ramadi governate; Tikrit holding area (former Saddam Hussein Islamic School); a former train station Al-Khaim, near the Syrian border, turned into a military base; the Ministry of Defence and Presidential Palace in Baghdad, the former mukhabarat office in Basra, as well as several Iraqi police stations in Baghdad."

(EXCERPTS: Redress information &analysis)

Lakhdar Brahimi’s brief is a daunting one, that of:

"…restoring Iraqi sovereignty and independence, preserving the country's unity and territorial integrity, and making the Iraqi people truly the masters of their own destiny, with the political system of their choice and control over their own natural resources" (April 27, 2004: Brahimi’s statement to UN Security Council)

Human rights violations and no immediate release from detention for thousands of Iraqis, held without charge and or without access to family and legal representation, has meant the failure of the political strategy of the occupation.

In regards the situation Fallujah, Najaf and Karbala, Brahimi’s realisation of the situation is as thus:

"The CPA is well aware that, unless this stand-off and now this fighting is brought to a resolution through peaceful means, there is great risk of a very bloody confrontation. They know as well as, indeed, better than everyone else, that the consequences of such bloodshed could be dramatic and long-lasting"

"The nature of these dynamics, together with the general insecurity prevailing in the country, certainly had an impact on our visit" (April 27, 2004: Brahimi’s statement to UN Security Council)

As of May 19, 2004, there had been 466 US hostile fatalities (reported by the US Department on Defence) since May 1, 2004. Sometime in May 2004 a figure of 200 US hostile fatalities since April 2004 looms ominously on the event horizon. Significantly, even without any major conflict in the stand-offs in Fallujah, Najaf and Karballah, there is a general armed resistance in Iraq that drifts towards the failure of the military strategy of the occupation.

Financially, the occupation and the "war on terror" budget was running at an average rate of US$4.7 billions a month. Since the very beginning of April 2004 events have been moving ahead of the "war on terror", it is more than reasonable to assume that the budget now runs at over US$5 billions a month and towards the failure of the occupations financial strategy.

There is, indeed, an obvious dialectical link:

"Between security on the one hand, and the end of occupation, the restoration of sovereignty and independence and the advent of a legitimate Iraqi government and political regime on the other, there is a dialectical link which is obvious. Security is essential for the process to be completed." (April 27, 2004: Brahimi’s statement to UN Security Council)

"So: Is it possible for the process to proceed under such circumstances? Will it be viable? Will it be credible? I put it to you and the Council, Mr. President, that there is in fact no alternative but to find a way of making the process viable and credible" (April 27, 2004: Brahimi’s statement to UN Security Council)

If there is to be no permanent and general ceasefire – with a timetable for the withdrawal of occupation forces, and a timetable for introduction of a UN multi-national peacekeeping force – then the prospective event of the transfer of authority on June 30 /July 1, 2004 becomes somewhat unrealisable. Ralph Nader’s (Green Party Presidential candidate) timeline as published in USA Today on April 23, 2004, is a valid appraisal of the current situation and at the very least a starting point for further detailed discussion.

Last but not least, the premise for the invasion and occupation of Iraq, Iraq’s possession of "Weapons of Mass Destruction", remains a flawed/false assertion.

The US and UK governments are now at a complete loss strategically, and seem to be oblivious to the facts of the matter.

There can be no viable and operable UN Security Council resolution if the above issues are not realised, and if there is no viable and workable resolution then the transfer of authority scheduled for June 30, 2004 will become an unrealisable proposition.

In the English language Internet edition of the Tehran Times (16 May 2004) it was reported that a "UN resolution could be ready in a fortnight". As of May 24, 2004, the world awaited the Anglo-American draft resolution with eager anticipation, President Bush’s address to the American people may take the form of another defence of policy in the current series of apologia of this failed policy of occupation. Whatever the case maybe, the timeline reported in the Tehran Times of June 10, 2004, would seem to be beyond the outer limits of an expedite and contemporaneous resolution of the Iraq crisis. In this regard one can only reiterate "that there is in fact no alternative but to find a way of making the process viable and credible". As of May 23, 2004, Iran issued a "formal warning" as US tanks and troops increase their presence in the Shia holy cities of Al-Najaf, Kufa, and Karbala (as reported by Agence France Presse: May 23, 2004).

As of May 27, 2004, Spanish forces are set to leave Iraq completely, with government and people of Spain having arrived at the decision that Spain can no longer be a part of the military occupation without the necessary validation of a UN Security Council resolution. It is at this juncture that I am reminded of the events of February 15 to March 13, 2003, as recollected by Dr Hans Blix in his book Disarming Iraq, in particular Jeremy Greenstock’s (UK, UN Ambassador) attempts to gain "traction" for the British benchmark paper on March 13, 2004, with war due any time after March 17, 2004. Even Blix’s "theoretical" proposition of a ten-day period of compliance of the five benchmarks that were to be drawn from the "cluster document" was too late and too short. March 1 or 2, 2003, as a start time, would have been realistic if only all involved had arrived at this understanding at an earlier date, however the reality was that the will was not there, or as Blix puts it: "With the knowledge that the US would not give Iraq even five days to attain a short-list of five benchmark tasks, there was something surreal about finalising UNMOVIC’s work program, which was to identify key tasks to be solved hopefully within the four months." (Disarming Iraq, page 249). In order that this pattern of events should not recur, there needs to be a revision of the current draft resolution (of 24 May 2004) over the next few days, the issue of time management must be taken seriously if we are not see the crisis worsen and run further out of control. In the week following the scheduled withdrawal of Spanish troops there must be a resolution of the crisis if events are not to be allowed to drift towards a point of futility. If this is not to be, then it will be that the Spanish people and government will have made the right decision in withdrawing their troops.

The question of the treatment, legal status and release of Iraqi detainees; and a timeline for the withdrawal of occupation forces, being just two of the outstanding issues that need to be resolved troops from Iraq. President Bush’s speech of May 24, 2004, did not represent the meaningful and substantive revision that the circumstances demanded. Whilst Tony Blair’s utterances (as reported by Reuters, London 25 May 2004) are best described as: "statements of aspiration or spin". (Toby Dodge, of the International Institute of Strategic Studies – Reuters, London, 25 May 2004).

Or as one US analyst put it:

"British Prime Minister Tony Blair has insisted that the transition government will have full power to eliminate these foreign troops from Iraqi soil – but does anyone really believe that they would do so, with the United States controlling the ongoing political process?

Blair's statements, furthermore, are not binding on the United States; his announcement can only be seen as a public relations fiction. One must assume that the transitional government will be sovereign in name only." (William O Beeman, Director of Middle East Studies at Brown University – Pacific News Service, 25 May 2004)

US Secretary State Colin Powell betrays a realistic view of the Bush administration’s intentions when he states:

"Obviously, we would take into account whatever they [the prospective Iraqi interim government] might say at a political and military level.

Ultimately, however, if it comes down to the United States armed forces protecting themselves or in some way accomplishing their mission in a way that might not be in total consonance with what the Iraqi interim government might want to do at a particular moment in time, US forces remain under US command and will do what is necessary to protect themselves." (Reuters – London, 25 May 2004)

There is still time (just) to achieve the resolution of the Iraq crisis but whether there is the genuine will on the part of the occupying powers to do so, remains a matter of grave concern and doubt.

In regards to the wider Middle East conflict and the Israeli actions in Rafah since May 1, 2004, the Israeli state is guilty of the killing of men, women and children, to date sixty-two in total, with twenty-five out of this total being under 18.

The demolition of 277 homes, with the consequent displacement of over two thousand Palestinians, has been condemned by Human Rights organisations as "war crimes". Two hundred and eighty others were injured. Rafah Ali Mussa (Director of Abu Yussef Al-Najjar hospital) stated that half of this total was comprised of children. (Xinhuanet – 26 May, 2004).

"This is the ‘the big poison in the region’ that is making his [Lakhdar Brahimi] work harder in Baghdad. Brahimi’s comments were made on ABC’s ‘This Week’ current affairs programme on 25 April 2004, he also criticised US action’s concerning the situation in Fallujah saying that: ‘When you surround a city, you bomb the city, when people cannot go to hospital, what name do you have for that? If you have enemies there, this is exactly what they want you to do, to alienate more people so that more people support them rather than you,’." (Washington Times – 27 April, 2004),

As yet there seems to be no end to "Operation Rainbow", the Israeli occupation of Rafah, however the longer it continues, the more it is that a state violence and instability will exist with the Israeli state being the most active agent in this cycle of events. End the occupation now!

On May 27, 2004, Dan Senor the CPA spokesman confirmed the suspension of the offensive in Najaf, with Moqtada Al-Sadr having made an agreement with Shiite elders to do likewise, there is now a possibility that the world will see the dawning of a new era. These hopes as at May 31 remain as such tenuous. In mid-April 2004 a cease of sorts was negotiated throughout this period US forces have taken the opportunity to improve their military position by trying to crush the resistance and the "Mahdi army" in particular. As yet their appears to be no change in the situation and there is little confidence to be had in the assertion that there will be change for the better, as the US forces take advantage of the truce offered by Al-Sadr, to improve their position.

As events move into an extra-time period, negotiations are expected to proceed, in Iraq and at the UN Security Council, over the next two weeks (from the 24 May 2004), towards the resolution of the Iraq Crisis, notwithstanding the fact that crisis and problematic issues mentioned above are extant, and that Al Gore’s speech at New York University (May 26, 2004) remains a well-drawn observation and critique of the true character and nature of the Bush administration and its policies.

IN CONCLUSION

Events at this time are shifting and changing constantly, nevertheless the focus of all should be on a just outcome for the people of Iraq, and the resolution of the crisis in regard to the outstanding problematic issues, as considered above.

On May 28, 2004, the Governing Council (GC) appointed CIA-backed exile Iyad Allawi as the Prime Minister of the "interim government" which may well prove to be a "poisoned chalice", if there is no momentum towards the end of the occupation. It now becomes that the UN, US and the GC are now at odds with each other as Allawi is not the US/UN choice. Iraqis, whether they are members of the GC or not, for one reason or another no longer implicitly trust Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations or the Coalition Provisional Authority. The appointment of Allawi by the GC is seen as the GC hijacking the process from the US and UN and is a surprise manoeuvre.

Although 613 Iraqi detainees were released from gaol, the fact of the matter is that thousands upon thousands are held in custody (eleven thousand reportedly). It is that those referred to by Lakhdar Brahimi on April 14, 2004, and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention UNCHR on May 5, 2004, should be released. There is a most pressing need for this issue to be resolved over the coming week (from May 31, 2004); it is that there is a moral and legal duty that must see the release of thousands of Iraqi detainees.

Having reached the figure of two hundred US hostile fatalities since April 1, 2004, with untold hundreds of Iraqis dead, and with no permanent and general ceasefire established, the occupation moves towards strategic failure.

In order to maintain the momentum towards the resolution of the crisis, there needs to be further revision of the current draft Security Council resolution. At the very latest by June 1, 2004, a revised UN Security Council resolution should circulated at the Security Council as in early June 2004 the occupation moves towards strategic failure. With the release of prisoners and a meaningful revision of the draft resolution and more positive steps towards a general and permanent ceasefire, in order to secure peace and stability in Iraq, progress could be made.

As of June 1, 2004, the GC appointed Ghazi Mashal Ajil Yawar, to the largely ceremonial post of President and then immediately disbanded itself, leaving the CPA in place until the June 30, 2004, deadline for the handover of power. Mr Yawar is apparently not the preferred US choice.

Allawi has announced a thirty member cabinet, his and their task is a tough one, to say the least, and the outlook is that this whole process is entering the surreal, i.e. a government with no real authority or power; an occupation whose purpose ostensibly is to provide security whilst the issue of security remains stubbornly intractable; a diplomatic process that is at a loss; and the imminent strategic failure of the occupation.

President Bush is of the habit of comparing the invasion and occupation of Iraq with the heroic struggle and victory over fascist tyranny and genocide that was World War II; this is plainly ludicrous.

As of June 1, 2004, there is no revised or amended draft UN Security Council resolution to be had.

(Written) 19 May 2004, (revised) 25 May 2004, (second revision) 29 May 2004, (third revision) 31 May 2004